The recent announcement by India to place the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) of 1960 “in abeyance” has generated intense scrutiny across legal, diplomatic, and strategic circles. This development comes against the backdrop of the Pahalgam terror attack, marking a significant shift in India’s posture towards Pakistan. The decision raises two crucial questions: Is the unilateral suspension of an international treaty legally valid? And does India have the practical infrastructure to enforce such a decision?
Treaties in Turbulence
From a legal standpoint, the phrase “hold in abeyance” used by India in its communication is not recognised under international treaty law. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), 1969, which codifies the rules governing the creation, interpretation, and termination of treaties, contains provisions for suspension and termination but makes no mention of “abeyance.” Although neither India nor Pakistan is a party to the VCLT (Pakistan has signed but not ratified, while India has not signed), it is generally accepted that much of the VCLT reflects customary international law and is therefore binding in many respects.
The distinction between suspension and termination is not merely semantic. Article 60 of the VCLT allows a party to suspend a treaty in response to a material breach by the other party, but such a determination requires objective justification and often invokes third-party adjudication. Moreover, Article 62, which allows for treaty termination or suspension due to a “fundamental change of circumstances,” is interpreted narrowly by international courts. Past rulings, including the Fisheries Jurisdiction Cases (United Kingdom v. Iceland; Federal Republic of Germany v. Iceland), have clarified that economic, political, or security changes alone do not meet the threshold.
The Indus Waters Treaty, brokered by the World Bank in 1960, was a landmark achievement in transboundary water cooperation. It allocates the eastern rivers (Ravi, Beas, Sutlej) to India and the western rivers (Indus, Jhelum, Chenab) to Pakistan. Importantly, the treaty does not contain a unilateral exit or suspension clause. Article 12 stipulates that any modification must occur through mutual agreement, thereby precluding unilateral actions. Consequently, India’s declaration, even if politically symbolic, lacks legal enforceability under the plain terms of the treaty.
The matter is further complicated by the three-tiered dispute resolution mechanism embedded within the IWT: first, a Permanent Indus Commission; second, a Neutral Expert appointed by the World Bank; and third, a Court of Arbitration (CoA). These procedural avenues are designed to avoid precisely the kind of deadlock that has now emerged. Disagreements over the Kishenganga and Ratle hydropower projects illustrate the strain, India sought resolution through a neutral expert, while Pakistan requested a CoA. The World Bank eventually appointed both, leading to India’s partial boycott of proceedings.
Pakistan’s retaliatory stance threatening to hold the Simla Agreement (1972) “in abeyance” adds another layer of complexity. Signed after the 1971 war, the Simla Agreement sought to embed bilateralism as the guiding principle in India-Pakistan relations, particularly on Kashmir. While not a rigidly binding treaty in the legal sense, it has long served as the diplomatic framework governing regional engagement. Its suspension, however informal, could pave the way for internationalisation of the Kashmir dispute, which India has traditionally opposed. Pakistan could seek support from entities such as the UN, Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), or allied states.
One must also consider the practical dimension. More than 80% of Pakistan’s agriculture and a third of its electricity generation depend on the Indus system. While India is entitled to limited use of the western rivers under the treaty, including non-consumptive uses such as hydroelectricity, the country lacks the massive storage and diversion infrastructure needed to significantly restrict flows to Pakistan. Building such capacity would take decades and enormous resources, rendering any short-term disruption technically implausible.
Perils of Unilaterism
In sum, India’s declaration to suspend or “hold in abeyance” the IWT represents a symbolic assertion of political will, but rests on legally uncertain ground. The absence of clear procedural justification under the treaty or customary international law, combined with infrastructural limitations, renders the move more declarative than enforceable. At the same time, Pakistan’s reciprocal threats risk undermining the bilateralism enshrined in the Simla Agreement, opening the door to external mediation and potentially destabilising an already fragile peace architecture. In the realm of international law and diplomacy, actions carry implications beyond intention—and this episode exemplifies the delicate balance between law, strategy, and political signalling in South Asia.
